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Whither Financial regionalism among asean+3
Having experienced a major crisis in 1997-98, several regional 
cooperative arrangements in finance were designed by ASEAN+3 
to mobilize collective responses to cope with major financial crises. 
While the current global financial crisis poses a serious challenge 
to the adequacy of existing regional mechanisms and institutions for 
crisis prevention and management, it provides a good opportunity 
for ASEAN+3 countries to press for more legitimacy of the global 
financial arrangements. In the absence of an effective global solution, 
the West now place their hope in the key member states of the 
ASEAN+3 collective action to mitigate the severity of the impending 
global recession. Can ASEAN+3 rise to the expectation? In view 
of the magnitude of the crisis as well as weaknesses of the existing 
regional financial cooperation, it remains to be seen what impact the 
current global financial turmoil would have on financial regionalism 
between ASEAN and the ‘plus three’ countries - China, Japan and 
South Korea. Whether an effective global solution is emerging is the 
central issue and one which will determine the future direction of 
East Asian financial regionalism. This further raises the question of 
whether financial regionalism is still relevant. An attempt is made in 
this article to address these issues.
Keywords: ASEAN+3, Financial regionalism, financial crisis, international 
financial architecture, financial governance
Introduction
Having experienced a major crisis in 1997-98, several regional 
financial and monetary cooperative arrangements (simply referred to as financial 
regionalism) were designed by ASEAN+3 to mobilize collective responses to 
cope with major financial crises. The painfully slow progress of reform of the 
international financial architecture that includes the prevention, management, 
and resolution of financial crises in a timely and effective manner, as well as the 
failure of international organizations, particularly the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) to foresee the crisis and effectively deal with it led to renewed 
calls for some kind of regional cooperation in the monetary and financial 
spheres. These include the series of bilateral swaps and repurchase agreements 
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under the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), the Asian bond market and Asian Bond 
Fund (ABF), as well as regional and multilateral surveillance. While there are 
a few policy options at the national level of financial governance to deal with 
financial globalization with its huge, volatile capital flows, namely, exchange 
rate management, prudential regulations, and capital controls, Chin (2006: 67-
68) argues,  for various reasons, that these measures need to be accompanied or 
supplemented by greater monetary and financial cooperation among monetary 
authorities in the region.
Nevertheless, the US subprime crisis that has blown into a full-scale 
global financial crisis poses a serious test on the adequacy of the existing 
regional mechanisms and institutions for crisis prevention and management. 
In the absence of an effective global solution, the West now place their hope in 
the key member states of the ASEA+3 collective action to mitigate the severity 
of the impending global recession. Can ASEAN+3 rise to the expectation? 
In view of the magnitude of the crisis as well as weaknesses of the existing 
regional financial cooperation, it remains to be seen what impact the current 
global financial turmoil would have on financial regionalism between ASEAN 
and the ‘plus three’ countries-China, Japan and South Korea.
The next section of this paper begins with a brief review of recent 
developments of financial regionalism in the context of reforms of the 
international financial architecture from the onset of the 1997-98 East 
Asian financial crisis to 2008 when the global financial crisis began in mid 
September with the collapse of Lehman Brothers. In the following section, the 
paper examines the impact of the ongoing global financial crisis on efforts to 
establish a ‘new’ global financial order. Whether a global solution is emerging 
is the central issue and one which will determine the future direction of 
East Asian financial regionalism. This further raises the question of whether 
financial regionalism is still relevant. The final section of the paper provides 
some concluding remarks on these issues. 
Financial Regionalism Among ASEAN+3 Since The East Asian Crisis
In the aftermath of the East Asian financial crisis in 1997, the region’s 
leaders – and Malaysia’s voice was among the loudest – called for an overhaul 
of the international financial architecture in the wake of systematic speculative 
attacks on their markets and currencies. The calls initially went unheeded 
because the more powerful and influential countries simply thought that the 
Asian financial crisis was, well, Asian. Consequently, the crisis prompted 
several East Asian leaders to take more serious initiatives to guard themselves 
against future crises, and to attain financial stability in the region. At the IMF 
annual meeting in Hong Kong in September 1997, Japan proposed to establish 
an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), that is, a 100 billion US dollar fund aimed 
at providing trade finance and balance of payments support to assist the crisis 
economies in the region. While the proposal was supported by most of the 
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ASEAN countries, Japan’s pursuit of an AMF independent of the United States’ 
influence drew strong objection from both the United States and the IMF. Their 
opposition was based on the premise that an AMF will lead to a moral hazard 
problem and duplicate the IMF functions. Failure to invite the regional key 
powerhouses, particularly China, for discussion before the AMF proposal also 
caused some countries to be suspicious of Japan in dominating the AMF in a 
manner similar to the United States domination of the IMF. Eventually, the 
Japanese proposal was aborted.
The latter half of 1998 saw a sudden change in the global economic 
environment. What was perceived earlier as a regional crisis now appeared to 
spread beyond East Asia, as financial turmoil spread even further to Russia 
and Brazil in August 1998, and the near bankruptcy of Long Term Capital 
Management (LTCM) – a hedge fund based in New York – surfaced in 
September. When the global financial disorder threatened the United States’ 
stock market boom and economic stability, it appeared that the US policy 
rapidly shifted away from stringently imposing structural reform through 
IMF conditionality on crisis-stricken countries, in line with the Washington 
consensus, to giving priority to stabilization by opening public credit lines.
It is in this new context that the idea of establishing a framework 
that did not rely on the involvement of the US resurfaced in a variety of forms 
thereafter. A new Japanese proposal, the New Miyazawa Initiative (NMI), 
which was presented during the annual meeting of the IMF and World Bank in 
October 1998, did not meet the similar fate of the AMF proposed a year earlier. 
As noted by Tadokoro (2003, p. 232):
The US, in sharp contrast to its attitude towards the AMF, warmly 
welcomed the new Japanese proposal. The American endorsement of the 
Japanese proposal seemed to be a quid pro quo for Japanese support for a 
new short-term facility established within the IMF to bail out Latin American 
countries. With a financial crisis looming large in Latin America, the US 
Congress also finally agreed on the appropriation of $18 billion for an IMF 
capital increase.
The NMI was basically a package of bilateral assistance totalling 30 
billion dollars from Japan, mainly in the form of loans and credit guarantees 
to help revive the countries hit by the crisis. It complemented the IMF 
assistance in countries having IMF programmes in place. In countries where 
IMF programmes were not in place, it substituted for IMF aid rather than 
supplementing it. In 1999, the NMI was expanded beyond loans and credit 
guarantees, to include the establishment of backup facilities, in the form of 
currency swap agreements, with the central banks of South Korea and Malaysia 
(Amyx, 2002).
The NMI was seen as an initial step towards the revival of the notion 
of an AMF (Amyx, 2002). While welcoming a greater leadership role for Japan, 
the ten ASEAN countries at the same time hoped that Japan would consult 
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more actively with regional leaders, to ensure that the region’s concerns are 
reflected in the process. An informal regional grouping known as ASEAN+31 
was formed when Japan, China, and South Korea were invited to their summit 
meeting in 1997 in Kuala Lumpur. Starting from 1999, this emerging regional 
grouping has gathered its momentum when it expanded the level of cooperation 
between its member countries to include an annual Finance Ministers meeting 
held in parallel with the annual Asian Development Bank (ADB) meeting of 
the board of governors (Amyx, 2002).
The following ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers meeting in Chiang Mai 
in May 2000 came up with a framework to increase the availability of liquidity 
through swap lines as defense against future currency crises. This framework, 
known as the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), involves:
1. The expansion of the existing ASEAN Swap Agreement (ASA) 
among the prior member countries of ASEAN to all its ten member 
countries, and enlargement of the funds in this network to one billion 
dollars.
2. The setting-up of a network of bilateral currency swap agreements 
(BSAs) that included Japan, China, and South Korea.
As a result, the CMI, in principle, provides for 33 BSAs to be 
negotiated: 30 agreements between each of the three North-East Asian countries 
and each of the ten ASEAN member countries, plus three agreements among 
the three North-East Asian countries themselves. As Table 1 shows, only 16 
BSAs have been signed or are currently being negotiated among ASEAN+3 
nations since 2001, collectively amounting to 36.5 billion dollars.2 This 
framework provides short-term financial assistance in the form of swaps3 to 
member countries facing short-term liquidity problems. Supplementing rather 
than replacing the existing international financial arrangements, countries that 
draw more than 10 per cent under their swap arrangements must have an IMF-
supported programme in place.
As an effective regional surveillance mechanism is important to 
the working of the CMI arrangement, the ASEAN+3 finance forum adopted 
new mechanisms in order to enhance the surveillance processes under the 
CMI arrangement. These included deepening and broadening the exchange 
of economic reviews and policy dialogues among the ASEAN+3 countries, 
and strengthening regional capital-flow monitoring through data exchange and 
assessments of developments among members, and the training of personnel 
needed for these exercises.
1 ASEAN+3 is composed of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus 
the People’s Republic of China (henceforth China), Japan, and South Korea.
2 This amount is based on the overall availability under the BSAs, where the maximum 
drawing amount under two-way swap arrangements is counted twice to reflect the swap amount 
available to both parties under the agreement.
3 A currency swap is an agreement to exchange one currency for another and to reverse 
the transaction in the future (see Henning, 2002, p. 16, box 3.1).
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Notwithstanding this progress, three dimensions of the CMI make it 
fall short of being a functional equivalent to the aborted AMF (Amyx, 2004). 
First, the amounts involved under the CMI remain small and insufficient for 
stopping speculative attacks. Secondly, the release of 90 per cent of the funds 
in the BSAs is subject to recipient countries already having an IMF programme 
in place. Thirdly, the arrangements remain bilateral rather than multilateral.
Nevertheless, as pointed out by Katada  (2009: 10), “the current 
global financial crisis after the collapse of Lehman Brothers of September 
2008 helped the multilateralization of the CMI by making the leading countries 
compromise on and commit to a common regional goal”. Given the magnitude 
of the crisis, existing regional mechanisms and institutions for financial crisis 
management were grossly inadequate. Although South Korea was the first to 
be hit by the global crisis as its economy had been experiencing a major capital 
outflow since the onset of the financial crisis, it did not attempt to make use 
of the CMI to prevent a crisis from unfolding as the size of the CMI is still 
too small. The Korean economy has accumulated large short-term foreign 
currency debts which could easily turn into outflows and hence, depres the won 
rapidly. In the face of such vulnerability, South Korea’s President pushed for 
expanding the foreign currency swap deals by proposing a trilateral meeting of 
finance ministers of the ‘plus three’ countries in early October 2008 as well as 
establishing a currency swap deal with the U.S. Federal Reserve System in the 
same month (Hara, 2008).
Shortly after the onset of the global financial crisis, the ‘plus three’ 
countries held their unprecedented trilateral meeting ahead of the 14th ASEAN 
Summit. The trio agreed to work together with ASEAN to speed up the 
multilateralization of the CMI to further boost currency swaps in East Asia. 
Besides, the trilateral summit endorsed South Korea’s recent currency-swap 
deals with Japan and China totaling $60 billion (The Korea Times, 12 December 
2008). Setting aside their past historical issues and territorial disputes that 
can instantly stir intense public hostility, the ‘close-yet-distant’ neighbors 
meet to discuss measures to deal with the crisis. This will pave the way to 
a regular trilateral summit which “could gradually eliminate the deep-seated 
reservations amongst the big three in the region. They have been an obstacle 
to the speedy progress with regional cooperation” (Soesastro, 2009). Also, the 
trilateral cooperation may have been helpful in strengthening their collective 
partnership with ASEAN, as pointed out in an interview with Masahiro Kawai: 
“Japan and China have always been keen on strengthening ties with 
ASEAN, while South Korea has been slow in doing so. Furthermore, among 
the numerous bilateral ties that have been formed so far, the one between Japan 
and China has been the weakest. In that sense, it is quite significant that the 
Plus Three leaders came together to issue a statement to promote trilateral 
financial cooperation, as this can reinforce ASEAN Plus Three cooperation” 
(Hara, 2008).
Whither Financial Regionalism Among ASEAN+3
Jebat  Volume 38 (2)  (December  2011) Page | 49
Calls for the multilateralization of the CMI to be expedited came 
as the East Asian export-led growth has been thrust into chaos by the global 
downturn. The belief that Asia, led by a booming China and India, might 
somehow “decouple” from its reliance on the American and European market 
turned out to be a myth. The ASEAN+3 leaders got together to chart the 
necessary action to protect their own interests. In late February, before the 
14th ASEAN Summit, the 13 finance ministers of the ASEAN+3 agreed to 
expand the existing reserve pool plan from $80 billion to $120 billion as the 
need to restore financial stability became more pressing. They will discuss 
in April the fund’s rules (including the conditions for using the fund, the 
setting up of a surveillance unit that will monitor the economic situation in 
the region and provide an early warning to members) in order to expedite the 
multilateralization of the CMI. In principle, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Indonesia and the Philippines will each contribute equally to make up 20 per 
cent of the emergency credit pool, while smaller economies will contribute 
less, The remaining 80 per cent will be shared by the ‘plus three’ nations of 
ASEAN (The Nation  - Thailand, 3 March 2009).
Regional financial cooperation went a step further when the proposal 
for the formation of an Asian bond market garnered strong support from leaders 
and central bankers in the region. In June 2003, the Executives’ Meeting of 
East Asia–Pacific central banks (EMEAP), comprising 11 central banks and 
monetary authorities in the East Asia and Pacific region,4 jointly launched the 
one billion dollar Asian Bond Fund to invest in US dollar sovereign and quasi-
sovereign bonds issued in EMEAP countries (except Australia, New Zealand, 
and Japan). While the ABF addresses the demand side challenges, the Asian 
Bond Market Initiative (ABMI), which was later launched in the same year 
by the ASEAN+3, addresses the supply side issues by providing the necessary 
infrastructure for a well-functioning regional bond market. Six working groups 
have been set up, each addressing a key area for local currency bond market 
development (Asian Development Bank, 2004).5 A focal group has also been 
established to coordinate and monitor the work of the six working groups. 
Following the successful launch of the first ABF, the EMEAP launched the 
second ABF (ABF2), amounting to two billion dollars, to invest in the local 
currency bond markets in the region (Asian Development Bank, 2005). Half 
of this amount was allocated to the Pan-Asia Bond Index Fund (PAIF)6 and 
4 The countries involved are Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, 
China, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand.
5 The six key areas include new securitized debt instruments, credit guarantee and in-
vestment mechanisms, foreign exchange transactions and settlement issues, issuance of bonds 
denominated in local currencies by multilateral development banks, foreign government agencies, 
as well as Asian multinational corporations, rating systems and dissemination of information on 
Asian bond markets, and technical assistance coordination.
6 PAIF is a single bond fund index investing in sovereign and quasi-sovereign local 
currency-denominated bonds issued in eight EMEAP countries.
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the balance for the Fund of Bond Funds (FoBF),7 distributed to eight single-
market domestic currency funds.
Although the idea was not new, previous efforts to develop an Asian 
bond market as an avenue for channelling Asian capital toward regional 
financing did not succeed (see Amyx, 2004). The idea is justified, since 
international financial intermediation has been taking place outside the region, 
particularly in the United States. Capital-exporting Asian countries like Japan, 
Taiwan, Singapore, and the Arab nations have been using bond markets in 
the United States and Europe to lend out their funds, while Asian countries 
requiring capital have to raise their funds from Western financial markets. 
The proposed Asian bond market is aimed at lessening the need for Asian 
countries to depend on Western financial markets to recycle their funds, hence 
contributing to economic growth in the region. A regional bond market also 
reduces reliance of Asian countries on the banking sector. It also addresses the 
currency mismatch problem that contributed to the regional crisis.
One aspect of surveillance that deserves priority, but has yet to 
show much progress, concerns the need for effective dialogue among the 
participating countries about their expectations of as well as perspectives on 
exchange rate policy. Such a regional dialogue is essential to avoid potential 
currency conflicts that may arise owing to the different exchange rate regimes 
in the region. The recent conflict occurred after the 2001–02 depreciation of 
the yen against the dollar, which was favored by Japan facing a sharp recession 
during the period. Most governments in the region allowed their currencies 
to depreciate, partly matching the depreciation of the Japanese currency (see 
Henning, 2002, p. 89). By contrast, China strongly protests against further 
depreciation of the yen, which, according to the Governor of the People’s Bank 
of China (China’s central bank), could create ‘a domino effect of depreciations 
in Asia’ (Dow Jones International News cited in Henning, 2002, p. 27).
Obviously, the region needs not only a more effective regional 
cooperation on exchange rate policy but also more concerted efforts toward 
a common currency arrangement that can benefit the region. In 2001–02, 
officials in Japan’s Ministry of Finance (MoF) increasingly sought to use 
the cooperative framework within the ASEAN(+3) as a stepping stone for 
introducing a common currency in the region (Amyx, 2004, p. 9). A common 
regional currency can contribute to the regional public good of financial 
stability (see Chin, 2006: Table 4.1). But it turned out to be problematic when 
the MoF saw it as a way to stimulate Japanese financial markets by pursuing a 
yen-centred regional exchange rate regime, eliciting deep suspicion of Japan’s 
motives within the region. Owing to the widely diverse stages of economic 
development and structure of trade in the region, there clearly was no currency 
7 FoBF is a two-tiered structure with a parent fund investing in eight sub-funds, each of 
which will invest in local currency sovereign and quasi-sovereign bonds issued in their respective 
markets.
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arrangement optimal to all players in the region. Thus, the idea was viewed as 
‘one that focused on regional integration through the prism of Japan’s national 
interests rather than through the prism of greater regional collective interests’ 
(Amyx, 2004, p. 9). Consequently, few regional players were keen to commit 
significant resources in this effort, other than engaging in study groups under 
the ‘Kobe Research Project’, proposed by Japan in 2001.8Another initiative 
was the Asian Monetary Union or Asian Currency Unit (ACU) proposed by 
the ASEAN Plus Three at the finance ministers’ meeting in May 2006, which 
models itself after the European Currency Unit that existed as the region’s 
currency unit before the introduction of the euro. However, as Katada (2009: 
12) notes:
monetary cooperation at this stage has not given rise to discussion 
on convergence criteria or explicit macroeconomic policy coordination, which 
would be necessary in managing the stable exchange rates among the countries 
whose capital movement is relatively free (i.e., Mundell-Fleming Condition or 
Unholy Trinity). In addition, despite the concerns over global imbalance and 
the high dollar-dependence of East Asia, the currency discussion in the region 
has not yet converged into concrete actions.
Clarion Call For Global Solutions
The pressure to address flaws in the international financial 
arrangements seems to be weakened as the rapid recovery in the region in the 
early years of the new millennium was seen as proof of the resilience of the 
international financial system (Jomo, 2008: 22). The reforms initiated by the 
G7 toward enhancing political legitimacy of the global financial governance 
have been disappointing. They have not yet met the expectations of emerging 
market economies, particularly East Asia. In terms of representation and 
participation, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) – first convened in April 
1999, at the initiative of G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, 
in order to promote international financial stability, improve the functioning 
of financial markets and reduce the tendency for financial shocks9 – remain 
highly selective. While only two non-G7 Asian countries are represented (i.e. 
Singapore and Hong Kong), other key Asian economies such as China, South 
Korea and India are excluded.
Triggered by the US subprime mortgage crisis beginning around July 
2007, the global financial meltdown has taken down financial giants one by 
one — Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, Merrill 
Lynch, AIG. The collapse of all these financial giants is a clear indication of 
a systemic failure. Obviously, what differentiates the current global financial 
8 The project published its report in July of 2002 and recommended a monetary integra-
tion process for phase one to be completed by 2010, preparation for a single currency for phase 
two to be completed by 2030 and the launching of a single currency in phase three that would 
commence in 2030 (Katada, 2009: 12).
9 For details, see the website of FSF at http://www.fsforum.org/about/mandate.htm
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turmoil from the East Asian crisis is not only the gravity of its impact but more 
importantly the fact that the epicenter of the ongoing financial crisis locates at 
the influential advanced economies. Thus, it is not surprising to comprehend 
the swift attention and responses given by the global financial governance 
institutions to contain the problem. The current IMF traditional rescue program 
comes very promptly with fewer strings attached as compared to its previous 
rescue program during the East Asian crisis: 
“The IMF-led $25.1 billion bail-out of Hungary on October 28th 
was “fast, light and big. The rescue came just days after the fund agreed on 
a $16.5 billion package to shore up Ukraine’s collapsing economy, a prospect 
which seems to be unblocking the country’s wretchedly deadlocked politics. . . 
Iceland, which is negotiating a $2 billion bail-out from the IMF, is being forced 
to take some bitter medicine after the failure of its banks”. (The Economist, 30 
October 2008).
Due to the uncertainty of how many more countries the IMF and other 
lenders need to rescue and whether they can afford to do so, it was reported that 
Gordon Brown, Britain’s prime minister, wants countries with big surpluses, 
such as China and the oil-rich Gulf states, to contribute more (The Economist, 
30 Oct 2008). “We swim together, or we sink together,” said the European 
Commission’s president, José Manuel Barroso, as Asian and European 
leaders gathered in Beijing for a summit on October 24th and 25th that was 
dominated by the global financial crisis. France has proposed incorporating 
emerging economies into the exclusive G-8 club of industrialized nations but 
didn’t specify which emerging-market nations besides Brazil, Russia, India 
and China should be allowed to join. World Bank President Robert Zoellick 
warned that extremely poor nations whose economies are most vulnerable, 
including many in Africa, also need a voice because their citizens will be most 
hurt by the current turmoil (The Star, 9 November 2008).
It is argued that the present global financial crisis provides a good 
opportunity for emerging economies, particularly East Asian countries to press 
for more legitimacy of the global financial arrangements. It ranges from the call 
to reform the IMF to the proposal of new financial governance arrangements. 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao did say that developing countries should have a 
stronger say in a new financial system although he did not go far in public to 
say that US’s de facto power of veto in the IMF should end. The reason for the 
modest demand is that China does not want “to be seen as a problem for existing 
powers” (Albert Keidel as quoted in The Econonist, October 2008) at this stage 
of its economic development.  But in this interdependent world, China is also 
feeling the pinch of the global credit crunch. On the other hand, Brazil and 
other emerging-market nations have long complained their representation in 
the IMF and World Bank is insufficient, and Silva proposed that the G-20 is 
better positioned to forge new international financial regulations, because it 
more broadly represents both rich and developing countries. All of this leads us 
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pondering as to whether a ‘new’, more legitimate financial order will emerge 
or whether global financial and political elites may attempt to establish a ‘new’ 
global monetary order that will concentrate even further power in their hands.
We have heard of the clarion call for a global system of financial 
regulation since the onset of the global financial crisis. It ranges from a 
global college of regulators, say; a binding code of international conduct to 
an international financial regulator. Nonetheless, what seems to be the main 
concern is the feasibility and desirability of global solutions. As Rodrik (cited 
in The Economist, 2009, March 12) argues, the logic of global financial 
regulation is flawed due to the following problems:
•	 It presumes we can get leading countries to surrender significant 
sovereignty to international organizations.
•	 Even if the leading nations were to agree, they might end up converging 
on the wrong set of regulations, as evidenced by the shortcomings of 
the Basel process, viewed until recently as the apogee of international 
financial co-operation.10 
•	 There isn’t a one-size-fits-all solution as desirable forms of financial 
regulation differ across countries depending on their preferences and 
levels of development. Financial regulation entails trade-offs along 
many dimensions. The more you value financial stability, the more 
you have to sacrifice financial innovation. The more fine-tuned and 
complex the regulation, the more you need skilled regulators to 
implement it. The more widespread the financial-market failures, the 
larger the potential role of directed credit and state banks.
Ocampo (1999; 15-16) identifies three features of the political 
economy of the current globalization process which have major implications 
for the global financial reform: the unwillingness of most countries, both 
industrialized and developing countries alike to give up economic sovereignty 
to international or even regional organizations; the disorganization of actors, 
particularly developing countries, in the international policy forum; and the 
incomplete and even lopsided character of the international policy agenda that 
accompanies the process. These features imply that “only weak pressures for 
substantial reform would be present, that any balanced negotiation process 
would be cumbersome, and that negotiation processes may underestimate or 
bypass altogether the interests of certain actors” (Ocampo, 1999: 16). Thus, it 
is argued that “an international system that relies on one or a few international 
institutions will be less balanced than one that relies on a network of regional 
institutions” (Ocampo, 1999: 16).  These arguments lead us to reflect on the 
case for regional solution in the new financial order which will be addressed in 
the following section.
10  Basel 1 ended up encouraging risky short-term borrowing, whereas Basel 2’s reliance 
on credit ratings and banks’ own models to generate risk weights for capital requirements is clearly 
inappropriate in light of recent experience.
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Is the Regional Solution Still Relevant?
The role which regional institutions can play in an international 
financial arrangement have not garnered much attention until recently. There 
are several arguments in favor of a bigger role for regional institutions in 
the new financial order (see Ocampo, 1999: 33-35). Owing to the growing 
macroeconomic linkages arising from increasing economic regionalization 
(i.e. rising intraregional trade and direct investment flows), demand for 
‘global public good’ (e.g. global macroeconomic stability etc.) and certain 
services in the area of international finance has risen including the provision 
of macroeconomic consultation and surveillance, as well as coordination and 
surveillance of national systems of prudential regulation and supervision. In so 
far as these services may be subject to diseconomies of scale and it is unclear 
whether others have strong scale economies to justify a single international 
institution, regional institutions can provide these essential services, particularly 
in the face of a dynamic process of open regionalism.
In addition, regional arrangements provide countries in a region, 
particularly the small ones that have limited negotiation power vis-a-vis large 
organizations “the access to a broader menu of alternatives to manage a crisis 
or to finance development” (Ocampo, 1999: 34). To the extent that no effective 
global solutions are forthcoming, a search for a cooperative solution could 
begin in Asia, widening the menu of policy options to individual countries in 
the region (Kawai and Lamberte, 2010: 43).
Thus, a regional solution is still relevant as Rodrik points out that ‘[i]n 
short, global financial regulation is neither feasible nor desirable. What finance 
needs instead are some sensible traffic rules that will allow nations (and in some 
cases regions) to implement their own regulations while preventing adverse 
spillovers’ (The Economist, 2009, March 12). It is necessary to establish at 
the regional level reliable and stable mechanisms not only for south-south 
recycling from surplus to deficit countries without going through Wall Street 
or the City, but also to provide development finance (Ocampo, 1999).
The global financial tsunami has provided further impetus to push 
forward  ASEAN integration. The declaration on the roadmap for ASEAN 
Community (2009-2015) was adopted at its 14th annual summit in March 
2009, thus turning the 42-year-old grouping into a rule-based organization 
(ASEAN Secretariat, 2009). This shows the commitment of ASEAN leaders 
to resolve the current turmoil to revitalize the region’s economy. Among the 
resolutions discussed to cope with the surging global financial crisis and 
economic recession include stressing the importance of macroeconomic 
policy coordination, standing firm against protectionism, implementing 
the integration of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint (by 
encouraging a free flow of goods, services and investments and a freer flow 
of capital across the region), working with the ‘plus three’ countries to speed 
up the CMI Multilateralization (CMIM) as well as cooperating with the G20, 
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particularly on the reform of the international financial institutions and markets 
(ASEAN Secretariat, 2009). There are still some doubts on whether ASEAN 
can be turned into a collective force to cope with financial crisis. Having 
accumulated some valuable experience since the 1997/1998 crisis, however, 
ASEAN has raised its capacity to some extent to cope with financial crisis by 
pooling regional forces to enhance regional cooperation with the ‘plus three’ 
countries.
Among the three areas of regional financial and monetary cooperation 
that have progressed so far as discussed in the previous section, the emergency 
liquidity funding arrangement of currency swaps under the CMI is the most 
institutionalized. Meanwhile,  the Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI) 
and Asian Bond Fund (ABF) are progressing gradually (see Figure 1) and 
informally. Despite the importance of addressing the dollar dependence and 
ultimate stability in regional financial affairs, there is currently not much 
commitment in the area of monetary and currency cooperation in the form 
of an ACU as member countries still have difficulty compromising their 
respective national macroeconomic policy autonomy for the sake of financial 
and monetary cooperation
In order for these areas of regional financial and monetary cooperation 
to be viable and operational, an effective mechanism of intensive regional 
policy dialogue is indispensable (Kawai and Lamberte, 2010: 43). Thus, the 
idea of creating an Asian Financial Stability Dialogue (AFSD) analogous to 
the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) at the global level was first mooted in 
September 2008 by Asian Development Bank (ADB) President Haruhiko 
Kuroda, at a time when the global financial crisis was reaching its peak. Under 
the ASEAN+3 framework, the AFSD which comprises the regional network 
of finance ministers, central bank governors, and financial market regulators 
and supervisors provides a vital forum to facilitate policy dialogue and joint 
action among the authorities so as to identify regional financial risks and act 
on them collectively. As FSF, under the auspices of the Bank for International 
Settlements, seems to be mainly concerned with preserving stability among 
major global financial centers, the former could be an agent of policy dialogue 
to discuss more openly national and regional policy interventions. This would 
not only promote longer-term financial market development and integration, 
but also represent a coherent regional collective action, providing Asian input 
for more effective global participation in global financial reforms. 
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Source: Asian Bonds Online. Available: http://www.asianbondsonline.adb.
org. (accessed April 6, 2010)n
Concluding Remarks
In the decade since the Asian financial crisis, Asian states have 
increasing realized the significance of enhancing regional economic and 
financial cooperation. The need for enhanced protection against destabilizing 
capital flows, especially portfolio investment and other short-term capital 
flows is all the more justified as the existing regional institutional economic 
arrangements under ASEAN and APEC have failed to provide regional 
public good of financial stability. Weaknesses of international organizations, 
particularly the IMF in dealing with the financial crisis effectively also spurred 
the regional initiatives to accelerate monetary and financial cooperation. Their 
traumatic and costly experience a decade ago has resulted in more willingness 
to set aside their differences in order to enhance regional cooperation so as to 
improve the region’s resilience to future financial crises. Prior to the onslaught 
of the current global financial crisis, new concerns have emerged following the 
region’s dynamic growth over the decade – how to tap its huge foreign reserves 
as well as how to cope with surging capital inflows.
Now and again, the severity of the ongoing global financial tsunami has 
brought the issue of financial stability to the fore on two fronts. First, problems 
created by unstable capital flows as demonstrated in the past two episodes of 
crisis implies that policy options at the national level of financial governance 
need to be supplemented by greater monetary and financial cooperation among 
monetary authorities in the region.. Second, the ASEAN+3 leaders realize 
that they have to build on the current momentum in regional cooperation as 
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existing regional mechanisms and institutions for financial crisis prevention 
and management are grossly inadequate. Third, they also realize that now 
it is a good opportunity to press for more legitimacy of the global financial 
arrangements, particularly associated with inclusiveness or representation, 
agreed systems of rules and fair returns (refers to the fair sharing of costs and 
benefits in cooperative efforts).11
Notwithstanding the clarion call for global solutions, there are 
doubts on its viability. A case in point is the letdown of Group of 20 (G20) 
summit on the global financial reforms in London in early April 2009 due 
to major disagreements among the US, Europe and developing countries on 
what needs to be done. Most European leaders pushed for stronger global 
financial regulations to prevent future crises. As a major center of finance, 
however, this is being resisted by the US, which favors more commitment 
to stimulus fiscal and monetary measures to boost economic recovery. While 
both the US and Europe want to use the G20 summit to enhance the resources 
and role of the IMF, the developing countries disagree on the revitalization of 
the IMF before it is reformed. Given the rising financial interdependence in 
Asia as well as the politically difficult challenge of reforming the international 
financial architecture that includes the prevention, management, and resolution 
of financial crises in a timely and effective manner, regional monetary and 
financial cooperation offers an intermediate alternative between national and 
international levels of financial governance.
Bibliography
Akyüz, Yılmaz. 2011. Capital Flows To Developing Countries in a Historical 
Perspective: Will The  Current Boom End With A Bust? South 
Centre Research Papers 37, Geneva, March.
Amyx, J.A. (2002), ‘Moving beyond bilateralism? Japan and the Asian 
Monetary Fund’, Pacific Economic Papers, no. 331.
Amyx, J.A. 2004. ‘A regional bond market for East Asia? The evolving political 
dynamics of regional financial cooperation’, Pacific Economic 
Papers, no. 342.
ASEAN Secretariat. 2009. ‘Chairman’s Statement of the 14th ASEAN 
Summit: “ASEAN Charter for ASEAN Peoples”’, available at http://
www.aseansec.org/22329.htm
Asian Development Bank. 2004. Asian Bond Monitor 2004, November, 
available at http://asianbondsonline.adb.org.
Asian Development Bank. 2005. Asian Bond Monitor 2005, April, available at 
http://asianbondsonline.adb.org.
Asian Development Bank. 2007. Asian Economic Monitor 2007, July, available 
at http:// aric.adb. org.
Bank Negara Malaysia. 2005.  Annual Report 2004, Kuala Lumpur: Bank 
Negara Malaysia.
Chin Kok Fay. 2006. ‘East Asian Monetary and Financial Cooperation: The 
Long Road Ahead’, in Louis-Philippe Rochon and Sergio Rossi (eds) 
11 For detail, see Sohn (2005: 489-490)
Article: Chin Kok Fay
Jebat  Volume 38 (2)  (December  2011) Page | 58
Monetary and Exchange Rate Systems: A Global View over Financial 
Crises, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, US: Eward Elgar 
Hara, Manabu. 2008.  ‘Masahiro Kawai: Asia Currency Swap Should Reach 
$120 billion,’ The Asahi Shimbun, 29 December, available at http://
www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200812290043.html
Henning, C.R. 2002, East Asian Financial Cooperation, Washington, DC: 
Institute for International Economics.
Katada, Saori N. 2009. Political Economy of East Asian Regional Integration 
and Cooperation, ADBI Working Paper No. 170, Tokyo: Asian 
Development Bank Institute, November, available at: http://www.
adbi.org/working-paper/2009/12/01/3390.political.economy.east.
asia/
Kawai, Masahiro and Lamberte, Mario B. 2010 ‘Managing Capital Flows: 
Emerging Asia’s Experiences, Policy Issues and Challenges’, in 
Masahiro Kawai and Mario B. Lamberte (eds) Managing Capital 
Flows: The Search for a Framework, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Ocampo, José Antonio. 1999. International Financial Reform: The Broad 
Agenda, CEPAL Review, 69, December.
Ocampo, José Antonio. 2000. ‘A Broad Agenda for International Financial 
Reform’, in José Antonio Ocampo, Stefano Zamagni, Ricardo 
Ffrench-Davis, Carlo Pietrobelli (eds) Financial Globalization and 
the Emerging Economies. Santiago: ECLAC.Rodrik, Dani. 2009. 
‘A Plan B for Global Finance’, The Economist, March., available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/13278147/print
Tadokoro, M. 2003. ‘The Asian financial crisis and Japanese policy reactions’, 
in R. Geoffrey, D. Underhill and Z. Xiaoke (eds), International 
Financial Governance under Stress: Global Structures versus 
National Imperatives, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 223–
40.
Whither Financial Regionalism Among ASEAN+3
Jebat  Volume 38 (2)  (December  2011) Page | 59
